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Economists have two main ways of estimating the amount of real economic activity in a given 
period.  First, there is gross domestic product (GDP), which totals up the market value of 
production of goods and services offered within the period.  Second, there is gross domestic income 
(GDI), which represents the earnings associated with the production of the same goods and 
services.  In theory, these two measures are identical, but in practice they are not, since they are 
based on different sources of data. 
 
The output measure (GDP) is generally regarded as more reliable than the income measure (GDI) 
because there is a good deal of self-reporting of income.
1 In most years the GDP measure has 
exceeded the GDI measure. The average difference between GDP and GDI, known as the 
“statistical discrepancy,” over the years 1947 through the first quarter of 2011 is 0.5 percent of 
GDP. The most obvious explanation for this gap is that the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ GDI 
data depend on income tax data. Insofar as income is under-reported to avoid taxes, it will lead to an 
under-reporting of GDI.      
 
In a reversal of this longstanding pattern, the income side exceeded the output side by large amounts 




The Statistical Discrepancy between Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Income, 1947-2011 
 (percent of GDP) 
 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.10, Lines 1 and 26. 
                                                 
1 There is less variance in the quarterly data in the output measure than income measure. In addition, the mean revision 
from first report to the latest revision is smaller in the case of the output measure than the income measure, both 
factors that might suggest the superiority of the output measure. See Fixler, Dennis J. and Bruce T. Grimm. 2008. 
“The Reliability of GDP and GDI Estimates.” Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 















tCEPR  When Numbers Don’t Add Up  z 2 
 
 
This means that the income measure provides a somewhat different picture of economic growth 
than the more commonly used output measure. Compared to the GDP measure, the GDI measure 
shows more growth in the late 1990s, a steeper falloff in the 2001 recession, and then more rapid 
growth in the 2000s cycle. In order to get a better assessment of the movements in the economy and 
the impact of policy, it is worth determining the basis for the fluctuations in the size and sign of the 






One obvious place to look for an explanation for the fluctuations in the statistical discrepancy is 
capital gains.
2 In principle, capital gains should not be counted in GDP. They reflect the change in 
the price of existing assets, not the value of newly created goods and services. However, as a 
practical matter, it is virtually inevitable that some amount of capital gains income will be 
misclassified as wage or profit income.  
 
While long-term capital gains are given favorable tax treatment, short-term capital gains are taxed as 
ordinary income. Therefore, it is likely that some number of taxpayers will carelessly record their 
short-term capital gains income as ordinary income.  Clearly, the IRS has no incentive to pursue this 
kind of error, but any such errors would increase the amount of ordinary income reported.  Such 
errors would most likely appear in the household sector, as the business sector has—as a rule—the 
necessary experience and accountants to avoid any accidental misreporting of income. 
 
It is also likely that some amount of long-term capital gains income shows up as normal income as 
well, despite the tax benefits given to long-term gains. Inevitably there will be some misclassification. 
If the misclassification for both reasons is a constant portion of capital gains, then it would imply 
that the greater the amount of capital gains in the economy relative to GDP, the greater will be the 
overstatement of income relative to output.
3 
 
Figure 2 shows the pattern in the statistical discrepancy (in billions of annualized dollars) over the 
last two decades. As can be seen, the peak negative values of the statistical discrepancy coincided 
with the two most significant asset bubbles since the Great Depression—the dot-com bubble of the 
late 1990s and the real-estate bubble of the 2000s. 
 
                                                 
2 As an alternative explanation, Mark Thoma links the statistical discrepancy to increases in the government share of 
output. See Thoma, Mark. 2005. “Explaining the Discrepancy Between GDP and GDP with Non-Defense Related 
Government Consumption.” Economist’s View, August 26. Available at 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2005/08/explaining_the_.html. 
3 There undoubtedly is misstatement in the other direction with people hiding ordinary income as capital gains income. 
However, misclassification in this direction would presumably be roughly constant as a share of GDP, except in 




The Statistical Discrepancy between Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Income, 1990-2011  
(billions of annualized dollars) 
 
 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.10, Line 26 
 
Figure 3 shows the inverse relationship between the statistical discrepancy and household net 
worth.
4  The statistical discrepancy turns sharply negative as households become unusually wealthy 
and reverts as household assets fall. 
 
FIGURE 3 
The Statistical Discrepancy and Net Wealth, 1952-2011 
 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.10, Lines 1 and 26; Fed Flow of Funds Table B.100, Line 42.
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A simple regression gives us an idea of how much of an effect household net worth might have on 
the statistical discrepancy.  As seen in Table 1, an increase in household net worth corresponding to 
100 percentage points of quarterly GDP (25 percentage points annualized) is associated with a fall in 

























(a) 0.766  --
(a) 0.767 
R
2 0.63  0.13  0.42  0.12 
Durbin-Watson 0.64  2.34  0.47  2.15 
** 1% level of significance. (a) Not corrected for AR(1) errors. 
 
 
The exact timing of the relationship between misreporting of a capital gain and when the gain took 
place is not obvious. After a large run-up in asset prices, wealth holders may realize a large gain as 
the market itself is falling.  Similarly, many may wait to realize capital gains on assets that were 
purchased at market lows.  Thus, it is unclear whether the actual capital gains would be better than 
the valuation level in explaining the statistical discrepancy.  
 
Therefore, in order to test whether misreporting of capital income drives the statistical discrepancy, 
we regress the statistical discrepancy (as a share of GDP) against lags of household-owned corporate 
equities and real estate (also as shares of GDP).  The results are shown in Table 2. 
 




The Impact of Capital Gains in the Household Sector on the Statistical Discrepancy 
Cumulative Effect of 
Faster Capital Gains over 
N Quarters
(a) 
Cumulative Effect of 





Lag (N)    
Corporate 
Equities Real  Estate  
Corporate 





































































(0.007)** 0.25  2.06 
Notes: Levels of significance: * 5%, ** 1%. Prais-Winsten regression with statistical discrepancy (divided by GDP)
as dependent variable.  Semi-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variables are concurrent and N lags of
change in assets divided by GDP and Nth lag of asset valuation divided by GDP.  (a) Sum of coefficients on changes
in assets divided by GDP. (b) Coefficient on Nth lag of asset valuation divided by GDP. 
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, NIPA Table 1.10, Lines 1 and 26; Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Table




In all these regressions, assets had significant negative effects on the statistical discrepancy.  A single-
quarter increase in the value of household real estate corresponding to 10 percentage points of 
(quarterly) GDP is associated with a decrease in the statistical discrepancy by 0.04-0.06 percentage 
points in subsequent quarters.  The effect of a 10 percentage-point-of-GDP increase in the value of 
household ownership of corporate equities was larger—a 0.07-0.13 percentage-point-of-GDP 
decrease in the statistical discrepancy in later quarters. 
 
The story does not substantially change in moving to lags of capital gains.  For corporate equities, a 
single-quarter’s increase in capital gains of 10 percentage points of GDP is associated with a 
decrease in the statistical discrepancy of 0.03-0.10 percentage points.  For real estate, the effect was 






                                                 
5 The authors also ran regressions that included capital gains and asset levels for assets of nonfarm, nonfinancial 
business. These regressions showed little or no statistically significant relationship with the statistical discrepancy.  See 
Appendix. 






There are two main reasons why it matters if the fluctuations in the size and direction of the 
statistical discrepancy are driven by capital gains. First, there have been some economists who have 
viewed the income side as providing additional and possibly better information on GDP growth 
than the output side. If the fluctuations in the size of the statistical discrepancy are primarily 
explained by misclassified capital gains, then the income side is not providing additional information 
on GDP growth. There is no reason to move away from the output measure or to take an average of 
the two. 
 
The other reason that this capital gain explanation would be important is that it would have a 
profound effect on our understanding of savings rates in the last twenty years. Private spending and 
taxation are well-measured, so any increase in measured income corresponds to an increase in 
measured private savings as well.  Thus, in normal economic times, the savings rate is generally a bit 
higher than reported.  During an asset boom, however, the actual savings rate may be considerably 
lower. 
 
Figure 4 shows the measured personal (household) savings rate as a share of disposable personal 




Measured Household Savings Rate, 1990-2011 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.1 Lines 26 and 33. 
 
 
From a high of 7.6 percent in the second quarter of 1992, the personal savings rate fell through the 
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in the early 2000s, the savings rate plummeted in early 2005 to 1.3 percent as the housing bubble 
neared its peak.  Following the collapse of the housing bubble, households began to resume saving 
and the rate again topped 6.2 percent by the second quarter of 2008. 
 
If, however, we believe that the statistical discrepancy represents misreported personal income, then 
the actual falls in savings (and subsequent recoveries) were considerably more pronounced.  Figure 




Official and Corrected  Household Savings Rates, 1990-2011 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 2.1 Lines 26 and 33; Table 5.1, Lines 9 and 43. 
 
As seen in the figure, savings rates were significantly higher in the early 1990s than reported incomes 
would indicate.  Savings may have reached 10 percent of disposable income by the end of 1992 and 
fallen all the way to zero by the first quarter of 2000.   
 
As a result, misreporting of income masked the depth of the fall in the personal savings rate.  Rather 
than an official fall of 5.5 percentage points, the savings rate fell by 10 percentage points.  For two 
years from mid-1999 to mid-2001, the savings rate stayed below 2.0 percent and stayed well below 
1.0 percent for nearly two years starting in the second quarter of 2005.  In fact, the corrected savings 
rate fell to a low of -0.3 percent in mid-2006 before climbing to 7.0 percent in the middle of 2009. 
 
Because household wealth appears to increase during asset bubbles, failure to recognize that the 
rapid appreciation in housing prices was unsustainable led to the failure to recognize that households 
were saving insufficiently for their future needs.  As the bubbles burst, households’ need to resume 
saving was assured. Insofar as some of the gain in wealth attributable to these bubbles appeared in 
GDP accounts as misclassified disposable income, the impact of the bubbles in discouraging saving 



























At the peak of both the stock and housing bubbles, there were extraordinary shifts in the statistical 
discrepancy between the national output and income accounts. The statistical discrepancy fell from 
its normal range of 0.5 – 1.0 percent of GDP to levels below -1.0 percent of GDP. The analysis in 
this paper suggests that this reversal was directly related to these bubbles, with the likely explanation 
that a portion of the capital gains from these bubbles being misclassified in national income 
accounts as ordinary income. If this is the case, then the drops in household saving during the 
bubbles and the subsequent rises following their collapse were even larger than the official data 
show.   





Appendix Table 1 shows a set of regression results that used the value of all corporate equity and 
real estate, including commercial real estate, as independent varaibles. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
The Impact of Capital Gains on the Statistical Discrepancy 
Cumulative Effect of 
Faster Capital Gains over 
N Quarters
(a) 
Cumulative Effect of 


















































































(0.009)* 0.24  2.15 
Notes: Levels of significance: # 10%, * 5%, ** 1%. Prais-Winsten regression with statistical discrepancy (divided 
by GDP) as dependent variable.  Semi-robust standard errors in parenthesis. (a) Sum of coefficients on changes in 
assets divided by GDP. Dependent variables are concurrent and N lags of change in assets divided by GDP and Nth
lag of asset valuation divided by GDP. (b) Coefficient on Nth lag of asset valuation divided by GDP. 
Sources:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.10, Lines 1 and 26; Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Table
B.100, Lines 3 and 24; Table B.102, Line 3; Table L.4, Line 11. 
 
 
 
 
 